This phenomenon is not contained to Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region but is a general attribute of the discipline of International Relations (IR) -it is not surprising that Kenneth Waltz himself -the founding father of neorealism -even jokes about those who would build theories on smaller states [Waltz, 1979, 72-73] .
Focusing more on small states in the MENA region and in general international relations bears huge importance, at least for three reasons. First of all, with exaggerating the importance of material size in world politics, scholars have built up a cognitive cage for themselves in which they fail to identify and 5 properly analyse the behaviour and the impact of small states in the international system. Second, by the 21 st century, the traditional constrains put on small states have been significantly eased due to systemic processes like globalization, the institutionalisation of world politics, and the emergence of complex interdependences. Third, in the Middle Eastern context, the post-2011 regional environment usually described as competitive multipolarity/heteropolarity [Kausch, 2014] , in which power is more diffused than ever among the actors of international politics. In this context, the leverage of smaller and medium-sized states such as Qatar, Oman and the United Arab
Emirates has grown significantly. The main method used in the dissertation was formal modelling [Snidal 2002 ].
I set up the complex model of size in order to interpret the process in which size effects political outcomes. The CMS has been based on two general ideas: 1 A separation used by seminal pieces of literature of the constructivist IR theory [Wendt, 1999, 22-39; Jepperson -Wendt -Katzenstein, 1996, 36-42] .
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 Normative size (idealist structuralism) is a result of interstate interactions. It refers to the perceived size and importance of the given state in the international community.
The contextual analysis of the effects of size. Building on the logic of Peter
Katzenstein [1985, [136] [137] , the CMS does not consider size as a "master variable" whose importance outgrows the relevance of any other aspects. Size interacts with other variables, let that be the extreme scarcity or multitude of a given resource, social homogeneity, aspects of regime security, the political system, etc. In order to understand how size effects political outcomes, one has to analyse these interactions between size and other variables on the one hand, and the different types of size on the other.
In the framework of the complex model of size, I used different methods to determine the different types of size of Middle Eastern states:
 to determine relative size, statistical comparison was conducted to see which Middle East states have lower than the average in all four general aggregate resources;
 to investigate normative size, the GDELT database was used to determine the intensity of interstate relations in different relations, building on the assumption that if a state is considered to be larger, the interactions with that state will be more intense;
 to analyse absolute size, I turned to the interactions between territorial, demographic, economic and military smallness and other variables to see whether the state compensates for negative consequences of small size or not;
 to set the perceptual size, speech acts made by the representatives of the small states were analysed in the United Nations Security
Council, and a few reliable surveys were presented as well. 
Findings regarding the systemic environment of small states of the Middle
East.
 In general, the Middle East is not as unfavourable for small states as one could assume at first glance. It is true that under-institutionalisation and lacking integration into the global political and economic system deprives shelter for small states, but other aspects can compensate for this loss to some extent.  The practice of intervening in each other's domestic affairs made social cohesion as the primary line of defence for small states, while 13 also contributed to the securitisation of social heterogeneity which seemed to be the most vulnerable point for each state, including small ones.
 The process of normative fragmentation and sub-regionalism since the 1980s which was beneficial for small Gulf states but -due to the lack of a common geopolitical identity -disenfranchised the small Mashreq states.  The Gulf rift of 2017 supports the assumption that large normative size can be beneficial and disadvantageous for small states. The active foreign policy of Qatar turned its neighbours against it. On the other hand, it also secured Qatari survival by the previous diversification of security relations. The Gulf rift also shows that by the 2010s, if a small state is able to bring a rivalry to the dimension of soft power, its vulnerability can be reduced significantly.
Findings regarding the variables interacting with different types of smallness in the small
 The case studies proved that neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism individually cannot interpret the small Gulf states'
foreign and security policy in a comprehensive way.
